

《Article》

Comparing Households, Labour Markets and Welfare States in Canada, Japan and Beyond*

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The Class-Gender Nexus

The class-gender nexus has three principle sites: within households, workplaces and civil society. These sites are governed by state, union and corporate practices. All are shaped by national traditions and experiences which configure relations within and between these sites.

The sites themselves are complex formations: households include the division of labour between the sexes and generations. Generations remain critical — parents and children multiplied to include the experience that shaped a person's formative years, the demands on their working lives and the requirements of dependent children and parents. How households connect to and limit or empower people's encounters with work places and civil society is the often invisible but critical variable for the class-gender nexus. Nations experiences a variety of immigrants, regions, times, etc. which all affect the national and international class-gender nexus and its transformation.

One of the most salient issues of our times in advanced post-industrial societies is how to respond to the changing world of work. How work is rewarded, organized,

distributed and even recognized is rapidly changing. These changes have their roots in work itself, that is, the types of work required by post-industrial societies. They also have roots in changes in the supply of workers through new household forms. Not to be forgotten are changes in the state both as an employer and sustainers of households through services such as health care, eldercare, childcare, etc. All these changes are themselves embedded in major changes in nations where they 'fit' in the world. This is the backdrop for my study of six nations, each with a distinct 'place' in the world and representing notable stages for broad processes to unfold.

Even within the domain of advanced post-industrial societies the character of labour markets varies considerably. Theoretically this matters to demonstrate that labour markets are social, political and cultural constructions, not only economic outcomes — especially the outcomes of

* This paper was presented at the special lecture meeting of the Department of Economics, Hokkai-Gakuen University on 12 May 2003

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the nebulously broad forces of ‘globalization’. Practically it matters because labour markets are key components of public policy concerning the experience of such diverse phenomenon as unemployment, training, education, immigration, race, ethnicity, gender, families (care for children, the aged), age (youth, aged), etc.

Gender, Class and Generation

Generation has taken on greater significance because people are living longer, having fewer children and labour market entry is changing. Moreover, ‘youth’ (those falling between sexual maturity and economic independence) have grown and are experiencing unique labour market ‘choices’: greatly extended education, ‘freeters’ and reduced opportunities for career jobs. ‘Freeters’ are a new generation of young people who have not continued in school and have not had access to core career jobs but support themselves with only part-time, temporary work.¹ We now learn that even young adults who do gain career jobs are experiencing a tremendous intensification of work because there are so few of them, especially those with computer skills, carrying a greater burden of work so they are being burned-out by job pressures. Instead of being ‘mentored’ and ‘brought along’ they are thrust into overload situations. The upper and lower age ends produce special ‘caring’ requirements — the elderly and children.

Child-care is not only for pre-school children but for after-and-before care for school-age children as well—who takes

responsibility (i.e. who can both respond and have the ability) for caring for all childrearing needs from education to taxiing to nurturing. All this occurs in a post-industrial economy which demands that women work to support their families and households.

Not only is women’s work important but their careers — careers are essential to capturing how entitlements from the labour force are translated into appropriate leaves to bear and take responsibility for children. This is particularly important in Japan where young women’s initial labour force entry is not into a career channel job and they have an extended ‘youth’ by remaining inside their parent’s households. The labour force and job market needs to consider careers and women as whole people—not only for leaves but also for rates of pay which are proxies for being valued and empowered in households.

Welfare State Regimes

Esping-Andersen’s classic work on the three worlds of welfare capitalism was about the issue of the de-commodification of labour by which he meant freedom from the labour market and reliance upon state-based rights. These three regimes were liberal where services are provided by markets which means they vary by individual success in labour markets; conservative where subsidies, not services are provided to the needy thus making it difficult for women’s labour force participation and promoting principal male breadwinners; social democratic promoting social rights

and women's labour force participation by way of services for care work. His recent work provides an institutional framework of welfare regimes that are an interaction of composite parts: labour markets, the family and the welfare state. All nations have combinations of each part but different 'accents': the Liberal Anglo-Saxon nations are "market-biased", the Southern European or Japanese are "powerfully familialist" and then there are the Scandinavians' welfare states. In terms of the six nations explored in my study, Australia, Canada and the United States are characterized as identical in Esping-Andersen's scheme with little labour market regulation, residual welfare states and non-familialist. Sweden is the outlier with medium labour market regulation, a universal welfare state and non-familialist. Germany and Japan share social insurance welfare states and familialism but differ on labour market regulation with Germany strong and Japan medium.² He claims "the emerging risks of postindustrial society come primarily from the revolution that is unfolding in both labour markets and households." This leads to his key argument focusing on "women's economic decisions", namely, his "key hypothesis" that "the household economy is alpha and omega to any resolution of the main postindustrial dilemmas, perhaps the single most important 'social foundation of postindustrial economies'."³ This is 'over the top'. Esping-Andersen has moved the household and women's labour force participation from invisibility to a pedestal. This leads him to dramatic conclusions about 'trade offs' between equality and other goals:

"The labour market craves greater flexibility, and more wage inequality is probably unavoidable if our goal is to restore full employment or, minimally, augment the supply of jobs."⁴ Does flexibility need to equal greater class and gender inequality? I contend there is a more complex relational configuration that is required both analytically and in practice.

O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver have as their primary goal the demonstration of variation within liberal regimes; that is, the complexity of the welfare state at the national level. They focus on states, markets and families as expressions of democracy, capitalism and gender relations. Each is transforming: the state includes various policies and the downloading to the markets involved in declining entitlements and greater work requirements; the family is characterized by increased divorce and unmarried parenthood and is the place for the articulation of key policy issues such as labour market supports, income maintenance and the regulation of reproduction; the market is characterized by an expanding service sector, greater casualization, more capital mobility and greater women's labour force participation.

My approach focuses on the practices of social welfare, paid work and unpaid work as located in citizenship entitlements, markets and households. Within each and through its relationships to the others I seek to discover the class-gender nexus. I think of three levels of abstraction: relations of reproduction, relations of production and welfare state regimes at one level, corresponding to domestic labour, paid labour and citizenship at an intermediate

level and concretely located in households, labour markets and social practices. Households include the 'long family' from childhood to pensioners while labour markets include the active period but also work-based pensions and all forms of 'leaves' which follow.

Work Life Regimes

Are there distinct, identifiable regimes of gender, capital, labour and state relations? And how have they experienced change in this era of restructuring at the end of the twentieth century? What effects do they have on labour market regimes?²⁵ This means, for example, understanding not only a social-democratic model as exemplified by Sweden but how the social-democratic regime itself is being transformed and with what implications for work.

Work life regimes are clusters of power, including institutions, practices and ideologies; labour market profiles are a combination of factors influencing who works and under what conditions. Included in labour market profiles are the relationship between school and work (when people leave school, whether they work while in school either part-time or part-year), the relationship between home and work (especially relevant for part-time work, the careers of women workers), the age of retirement and whether retired workers continue to work, restrictions on workers by citizenship requirements, the recruitment of labour forces through immigration practices, systems of unemployment compensation, discouraged workers,

and others. Age has become a key labour market factor, including child labour (minimum age) and 'retirement' as parameters of the labour market. Child labour spans 'baby-sitting' minimum ages (say 12 years) to exploited child labour in sweat shops or sweat fields and in between how work and schooling are combined.

Much of what we refer to as post-industrial work involves transformations in households. As Folbre and Nelson say, there is an "intertwining of 'love' and 'money'". They claim: "The shift of caring activity from family to markets represents an enormous social change. Markets on their own are unlikely to provide the particular volume and quality of 'real' care that society desires for children, the sick, and the elderly."⁶

I claim we do not have a crisis of work available since there is much to do and a great deal to care for — the young, the elderly, the environment, the homeless, the challenged, etc. We have a crisis of the valuing of work, its allocation and funding. To begin in the household, caring and reproductive work which can be repressive or rewarding, depending upon its conditions, is an essential site. And then the links between the household and its supports, on the one side childcare, schools, hospitals, care for the elderly, etc, and on the other flexible, supportive paid work — hours, leaves, benefits.

People want to be active and engaged but under conditions of their choosing and valuing. Many retired people are delighted to assist in childcare and activities for the elderly and there is much need for them. Many students wish to have

employment for experience and financial support for living and educational expenses. These ‘work’ experiences, however, must be meaningful and engaging rather than demeaning and exploited if they are to be attractive for so-called ‘marginal’ workers.

Flexible for whom is a question that needs to be asked of all these cases. For a state system striving to reduce health services, for clothing manufacturers seeking to compete with third world wages and for core post-industrial firms cutting their wage bills — that is what ‘productive’ has come to mean. It does not mean productive for healthy, well-rounded individual workers, households and societies able to reproduce themselves. Not even productive in terms of the work that is produced. Productive has become equated with cheaper; not with quality and value. Socialist-feminist analysis’ key insight into the multi-faceted nexus between class and gender as expressed by the link between the formal and informal economies, paid and unpaid work and the labour force and household remains germane under post-industrial capitalism.

Labour markets everywhere are socially constructed, not simply based on an abstract supply and demand for labour. Countries vary enormously for student work — both during the school year and during ‘vacations’ — and the practice of retirement. Important variations also occur in paid versus unpaid work, especially childcare and care of the elderly, and the use of low-paid workers. Addressing these issues is fundamental to calculations of ‘unemployment’ rates, working time,

work-life transitions, and youth and women’s labour force experiences. They form part of a nation’s work life regime.

Working time, who works and under what conditions have become newly re-contested issues under post-industrial capitalism. During this period of major transformations in work life regimes, it is particularly important that we understand how work is organized and distributed. Of interest is to understand the conditions (such as class formations, gender relations, the influence of age, race and ethnicity, immigration policies and labour market policies) upon which different labour market outcomes are contingent.

Households and Gender Arrangements

Household labour includes cross-gender and cross-generation issues; that is, the sex division of care for children and the elderly. Indeed it includes the care of three generations: children, the parents and the parent’s parents looked at from the point of view of the parent’s generation. Care also includes the maintenance and sustenance of households besides those requirements specific to the children and parent’s parents. The focus is on the allocation of responsibilities for care.

In “Modernization of Family and Motherhood in Western Europe,” Pfau-Effinger⁷ offers an insightful approach to gender and motherhood, contrasting with other approaches to ‘breadwinner’ concepts. She identifies five current gender culture models:

1. *“The family economic gender model”*

which applies to those families who own their own businesses (usually farms or crafts) and both sexes contribute to the family economy, as do the children.

2. “*The male-breadwinner/female-home-carer model*” based on the complementary separation of public and private spheres by sex.

3. “*The male-breadwinner/female-part-time-carer model*” with both partners in waged work except during active motherhood when women participate part-time.

4. “*The dual-breadwinner/state-carer model*” with full-time involvement of both parents in employment and “caring for children is primarily seen not as the task of the family, but to a considerable extent as the task of the welfare state.”

5. “*The dual-breadwinner/dual-carer model*” whereby “child-rearing is to a large extent seen as a responsibility of the family. The basic idea is that the family economy consists of an equal distribution of domestic — meaning in particular, childminding — and waged labour between a female and a male head-of-household. This is possible only because the labour market is organized in such a manner that structurally allows for parents to fulfill a ‘dual responsibility’.”⁸

There are several differences between the last two models. In (4) it is implied that the state delivers the childcare but it could equally be the case that the state support the family in delivering the care through a system of paternity leaves replacing salary and ensuring easy re-entry for those utilizing leaves. From this view-

point, (5) implies that employees earn entitlements to leave and flexibility from their employers in the labour ‘market’. Parents must have equitable dual activity in both domestic and paid work.

For our purposes, these can be modified into five general models of gender arrangements with sub-variations:

1. **Family Economy** based on self-employment encompassing family members;
2. **Male-breadwinner/female-carer** whereby women may work for pay so long as they continue to deliver the lion’s share of care work. Typically this means part-time paid work for women and the continuation of ‘housewife’ responsibilities;
3. **Dual-carer/career** whereby both partners have full-time careers and jointly cover and employment flexibility, whether sponsored by state regulations or employment entitlements;
4. **Single-parent** households with tremendous variation in labour force participation, ranging from 68 per cent of lone parents with children below six years of age in paid employed in Canada and the United States to 30 per cent in Australia.
5. **Single-person** households with variations between men and women, roots and roofs.

In Japan, the male-breadwinner model is often evident with young women starting employment after schooling in jobs that do not have careers, exiting upon marriage and often re-entering the labour market inside the family economy (as in model one,

often including the extended family) or as 'part-time' workers. Care for parents remains a major household task in Japan. About a fifth of non-agricultural employment in Japan is accounted for by self-employed and family members. About 11 per cent of Japanese women and 13 per cent Japanese men are self-employed but family workers account for 12 per cent of employed women outside agriculture (compared to only 2 per cent of men).⁹ The examples of single-person households for Japanese day labourers and transfer workers can be used to demonstrate that households are more about 'roots' than 'roofs'. Roots are about obligations and entitlements to families, independent of whether they live 'under the same roof'. Within the triumvirate of household, employment and state policies, households are typically absent for day labourers. In Japan a distinction is made between 'homelessness' in the sense of 'rooflessness' and 'rootlessness' which means detached from traditional home life. In Japan, a household is a 'registered domicile' so to be without household is to be free from obligation (and status, standing and support).¹⁰ Most day labourers either have rejected or been expelled from their households; that is, they are not only roofless but rootless. Ironically, many core workers in Japan (who are overwhelmingly men) who appear to be in stable jobs are transferred in mid-career for extended periods (three to five years) away from their families (*tanshin funin*). These transfer men appear to 'live on their own' as single households but in fact are financially and socially attached to the 'main house', usu-

ally in male-breadwinner/female carer relationships. Wives remain 'at home' to care for children's education, the household and dependent adults (often the husband's parents). Those transferred may be sent to branch operations, suppliers or other firms obliged to the parent company. Redundancy is often rendered invisible in Japan through the practice of *kyugyosha* or paying people not at work. Masanori Hashimoto identifies three reasons for *kyugyosha*: temporary layoffs, job searches, or family emergencies.¹¹ Not only does this raise questions about official unemployment rates but it illustrates some features of workplace welfare not often noticed in terms of private 'welfare state' activities. Roots are particularly relevant for obligations to the elderly — what responsibility does one have caring for their parents? And for children one no longer 'lives with'. They may return to the household or be entitled to covering their advanced education costs. Such regimes differ greatly between regimes where the state covers advanced education costs (as in Australia, Germany or Sweden) contrasted to those with higher expectations of family contributions (as in Japan, Canada and the United States). In Canada there is a trend toward returning to 'the nest' for young people. Among those 20-24 years, a greater share of young men in 1996 lived with their parents (74 per cent compared to 69 per cent in 1981) than young women (67 per cent of compared to 60 per cent in 1981).¹²

Seldom do unmarried young Japanese women live 'on their own'. 'Office Ladies' is a common status for unmarried Japanese

women (about a third of all women in the labour force), a status which includes living with her parents, thus lacking responsibility for domestic costs. As recently as 1991, 76 per cent of unmarried women in their 20s in Tokyo lived with their parents and few of these contributed to the household economy.¹³ This gives ‘Office Ladies’ financial and work-place freedom (albeit not much personal freedom or independence). Hired straight from school, they are expected to perform the most menial clerical tasks within an office ‘pool’ and are referred to as ‘office flowers’ with minimal career prospects. They are ironically empowered by not being in a career stream. Salaried men operate in a strict hierarchy of evaluation and promotion (unlike ‘Office Ladies’), including their ability to secure women’s cooperation since they are not in a direct authority relationship. Yuko Ogasawara tells of the specific ‘relations of ruling’ among ‘Office Ladies’ in Japan and how relations among the women are based on differences of education, tenure or age that produces tensions and stressful hierarchies thus leading to low solidarity. This partially accounts for limited resistance to the conditions of their work-life experience with its severe limitations on career and rewards. ‘Office Ladies’ typically exit their firms upon the prospect of marriage. Part of the explanation for limited conflict with men is the widespread practice of *shanaï kekkon* or marriage to a colleague. About half the Japanese couples wed in 1995 became acquainted through the workplace. Yuko Ogasawara concludes, “Under such circumstances, women may not perceive themselves as

positioned below men, but rather parallel to men. The belief that women are equal but different is a prevalent theory that masks structural relations of inequality by guaranteeing the sexual division of labor and differential gender characteristics.”¹⁴ This point is fundamental to comprehending household and workplace gender relations in Japan. Namely, gender roles which are clearly ‘different’ from men are not necessarily regarded as ‘inferior’ by women. A further dimension to these gender relations includes the demands upon men in ‘integrated track’ or core jobs who are expected to dedicate themselves totally to their work. Consequently, “The wives’ role is to provide various domestic services to husbands who have little time to take care of themselves at home and not to distract them.”¹⁵ These practices are described as an intersection of patriarchy and domestic matriarchy: “although the husband’s childlike dependency on his wife is an attribute of patriarchy, it gives the wife latitude to wield power by making her services indispensable. From the wife’s point of view, the husband who does everything by himself is less manipulable.”¹⁶

Germany is the paradigmatic case of the male-breadwinner model. It is important to note, however, that especially in working-class households women have been required to contribute through wage work with limited relief for domestic work. Middle-class households in Germany often employ immigrant women in order to sustain dual careers. Sue Yeandle reports for Germany that “the use of the paid labour of women outside the family to provide child-care, cleaning and other domestic services

by families that have dual earners, usually both in professional or managerial jobs, is an especially important source of polarization between women in societies where the state has not accepted responsibility for enabling parents to participate in the labour force.”¹⁷

In contrast, Sweden is the strongest example of a state-supported dual-career model with entitlements based upon state regulations and ‘earned’ labour market provisions. Eligibility requires working for eight months prior to a child’s birth and support based on a proportion of salary.¹⁸ Ironically, since it is mainly women who still deliver the care, Swedish women often work ‘part-time’ and are on leave from work but with income supplements and benefits. The careers of Swedish women are marked by the effects of these practices in terms of limited promotion through middle-class careers. Even Swedish men who choose to participate in paternity leave are negatively affected in their careers.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Sweden is the closest to a dual-carer model with provisions designed to ‘freely compel’ fathers to share in childcare. Household help is seldom hired in Sweden. Most support is delivered by parents through state-sponsored programs. In the United States, middle-class households are able to afford care arrangements supporting market-sustained dual-careers. This creates a substantial underclass of hired domestic workers and the development of low-wage service activities.

Not all household structures are the same. Single parenthood matters, especially in the United States where a quarter

of all parents are lone parents, with half of the lone-parent women with children under six working full-time, 17 per cent part-time and only a third ‘not working’; this differs from the pattern in Germany where a tenth of all parents are lone-parents and for lone-parent women, a quarter work each of full-time and part-time but over half are ‘not working’.²⁰

In Sweden and Japan, nearly all mothers of children for their first eighteen months are full time in the home. Elsewhere, new mothers tend to quickly return to work, especially in the United States where only half the infants are exclusively cared for by their parents and a fifth spend over an average of 40 hours a week in outside-the-home care. But Sweden and Japan are far from the same. Japanese mothers quit their jobs to give birth. Swedish mothers work in order to give birth: they are on work-based leaves, still technically part of the paid labour force, returning to their careers. Japanese women leave marginal jobs (often as “Office Ladies”) and return to marginal jobs (often in family firms or as so-called ‘part-time’ workers). Diane Sainsbury identifies what she calls the “greatest paradox” whereby 95 per cent of Swedish infants are exclusively cared for by their parents compared to 55 per cent in the United States.²¹

Some notes of caution: class matters in terms of the character of the relationships, especially for market-driven care; these are models and individuals can move between them over time, as the Japanese example reveals; family economy arrangements are often based upon patriarchy but may be

organized symmetrically; as the Swedish case illustrates, there may be a stronger commitment to dual careers than to dual caring, thus retaining some features of the ‘female-carer’ model.

Class Matters

Classes are both relational and distributional. They are distributional in the sense of a set of processes which allocate benefits within a society. They are relational in the double sense of identifying class locations and class powers. Because there are multiple class-related processes, one individual or one household can be located in a variety of property, labour process, employment or organizational (unions, parties, associations, co-operatives, etc.) situations, both themselves and for household members. Also, because of the variety of ways social subjects are constituted, the ‘identity’ or ‘perceived interests’ of individuals are a complex negotiation of many processes, including class, gender, race, age, nationality and citizenship. As the team of J.K. Gibson-Graham expresses it in *The End of Capitalism*, “Negotiation of a communal class process in households rests, in part, upon the growing economic independence and equality of women *vis-à-vis* their male counterparts.”²² That is, as incomes equalize, greater negotiation power, as they recede, lessens. Consequently there is a link between solidaristic wages and household organizations expected as mediated by class. In households “characterized by multiple class processes...the ironing might be done by the man in an

independent class process, whereas the cooking might be done by both partners in a communal class process, and the cleaning by the woman under a feudal domestic exploitive regime.”²³ In other words, households can be complex sites for class.

Elsewhere I have discussed class locations in some detail.²⁴ Class-based entitlements are also expressed though the labour market: executives have various packages (including stock options, cars, holiday places, club memberships and sometimes houses) while the new middle class and parts of the working class, often aided by union negotiations, earn entitlements to various pensions, health care or other provisions. Diane Sainsbury reports on the ‘occupational welfare’ system pervasive in the United States whereby many benefits are derived from the paid labour market rather than through state regulation. The effects are highly classed. Vacations are an example, whereby “individual employers and enterprises decide vacation benefits related to employment. The end result is fragmented, partial coverage, and enormous inequalities in the provision of benefits — with occupational welfare tending to conform to the pattern of market distribution. Coverage is most widespread among professionals, executives, and administrators and least among workers in such sectors as farming and services.”²⁵ The old middle class of the self-employed or contract employees often have to provide such benefits themselves. Classes themselves have gender content, as the brilliant work by Rosemary Crompton on the gendering of the new middle class demonstrates. She finds “although more and

more women are going into middle-class occupations, this trend has been accompanied by continuing gender differentiation within the middle class as a whole. This is reflected in patterns of family building and the domestic division of labor in different occupations.”²⁶

The Intersections Triad

The six relationships between the three sites are not boundaries but blurred and inter-connected spheres. Households include domestic labour, families and unpaid community work (volunteers). They are associated with the relations of reproduction and maintenance/supply-side. Labour Markets include paid work (market work) and relations of production/demand-side. Social Policy involves citizenship entitlements, communities and welfare state regimes/regulation. They are all classed and gendered but in different ways; that is, in ways that enhance or undercut the class-gender nexus. They can be identified as associated with three types of claims, entitlements or rights: family status claims, market citizenship entitlements or social citizenship rights.

1. Households to Labour Markets: **family status claims**
2. Labour Markets to Households: **market citizenship**
3. Labour Markets to Social Policy: **market citizenship**
4. Social Policy to Labour Markets: **social citizenship**
5. Social Policy to Households: **social citizenship**
6. Households to Social Policy: **family**

status claims

We can use the example of care to illustrate some of the complex intersections represented by these relationships. As ‘care’ (childcare, eldercare, sickness care, disability care, and household maintenance) is recognized as a collective (5) or commodified (2) service rather than individual responsibility there is an expansion in the paid labour market of caring jobs (1), either in the private or public sectors. As benefits from employment expand to cover care work in the home (2) for young children or needy family members, more household work becomes ‘paid’. This can occur through citizenship entitlements (5), commodification (1) or work-based entitlements (2). Population/immigration (4) or family (5) policies can drive the social welfare policies to reinforce or strengthen birth rates, especially when shortages occur in the labour market (3) or households can no longer cope with excessive care demands (6). If childcare or eldercare benefits are provided as a social service, then public sector jobs are created; if childcare benefits are cash, then private sector jobs result (either in households, including by parents themselves released from the labour market by paid leaves, or labour markets). One major difference is the quality of jobs in private and public daycare arrangements, including benefits for workers, such as maternity leave (2). This illustration could be drawn-out further but it introduces why the entire ‘web’ or context of these sites should be taken into account in a holistic analysis of the class-gender nexus. The interaction and substitution possibilities are enormously

rich, both theoretically and practically.

Another example of the mutual connections between households and labour markets is illustrated by Crompton's finding that "Middle-class women are moving into market work, and, as a consequence, domestic caring is becoming commodified. Thus, the household and the market are becoming even more intimately bound up with each other, and we might even begin to speak of the 'reembedding' of the household in economic life."²⁷ Illustrating the fundamentally gendered nature of this connection is the finding of Mark Western and Janeen Baxter that "work in the family and work in the labor market still constitute two largely gendered realms. Women assume responsibility for household work and adjust their participation in the labor market to accommodate it, while men prioritize activity in the labor market and fit their domestic work around it."²⁸ Arja Tyrkkö highlights the ways "paid work and care responsibilities are being combined" as a "central aspect of the concept of gender contract" which governs "dilemmas between working life and family life." She draws upon Yvonne Hirdman's characterizations of the 'housewife contract', the 'equity contract' and the 'equality contract'.²⁹ These examples illustrate that the interconnections bear a major class and gender content which favours men over women and the middle class over the working class. The link between social policy and households is illustrated by Wuokko Knocke and Roxana Ng contrasting Swedish and Canadian immigration practices. Swedish family policy in the early 1970s was tied to an attempt to decrease

the use of foreign workers, including separate taxation and generous maternity leaves, while Canada pursued an immigration strategy. Settlement practices for immigrant women have been distinct: in Sweden women receive a residence permit separate from their husband's enabling them to establish independence and a place in the work force whereas in Canada immigrant women remain marginal to state supports and dependent upon the male head of household.³⁰

The comparative categorization of employees as part-time is marred by inconsistent measures of hours worked, ranging from a high of 35 hours per week as a cut-off in the United States. In Japan, however, the issue is quite distinct. Susan Houseman and Machiko Osawa report "according to common notions of part-time work in Japan, a 'part-time' worker does not necessarily work fewer hours than a full-time worker" instead it is a matter of status. Official statistics are based upon employer-defined positions as part-time. Part-time employment for women increased as family and self-employment, as discussed above, declined, thus indicating a substitution of one kind of flexible work for another. Indeed, the evidence is that "the presence of a grandmother in the household increases the likelihood that a woman will choose full-time over part-time work." Other factors include taxation policy which reinforces the male breadwinner role.³¹ Married part-time women employees in Japan are called *paato* (in contrast to part-time student workers known as *arubaito*).³² This has become a hotly debated issue in Japan, as well illus-

trated through the insightful work of Osawa Mari on the casualization of work.³³ This is a topic richly explored in Canada by Leah Vosko.³⁴ In Canada, part-time work is strongly an issue for young people. While 24 percent of young people (aged 15-24) worked part-time in 1980, this increased to 45 per cent for 1999.³⁵ The combination of gender and generation in terms of the casualization of work is an essential key to the intersections triad. It illustrates that changes inside the labour market are a key part to policies seeking changes inside households, particularly with respect to the bearing of children and caring for the elderly. Osawa Mari has documented impressive changes in Japanese government policies concerning gender issues and caring as brought on by demographic pressures and changes in the welfare state.³⁶ Ito Peng's brilliant analysis of this restructuring illustrates the complexity of responses to the "caring hell" experienced by women at the end of the 1980s and the "quiet crisis" brought on by young women refusing to bear children. Both led to expansion of caring services but in the context of a shift of responsibility from the central to local level via privatization. Trade-offs in quantity over quality resulted in a situation whereby "the majority of care workers were fired from their positions in the local governments as of April 2000 and forced to seek work in the private sector." As she goes on to argue, "It is ironic that the system of social care extension in Japan which seeks to encourage women to work by relieving them of the care burden at home has seemingly led to a new system of care service

that employs women as low-wage, part-time and contract workers under the devolution and deregulation processes."³⁷ These issues call out for much more intensive investigation and understanding. In Japan and elsewhere the link between the quality and entitlements of labour market jobs, changes in the welfare state and the complex linkages with households requires our attention. Key here is creating the conditions whereby women/mothers want to enter and return to the labour force. This means creating attractive, well paying and benefited jobs with career prospects and an appropriate secondary labour market. It means dramatic changes inside the labour market to empower women so they can demand benefits such as various forms of care leaves to meet their household obligations while continuing their place within the labour market. These would be jobs that are 'family friendly' for themselves and their partners/husbands' accessibly. This includes sufficiently rewarding jobs that empower women at home through their financial contributions and with appropriate leaves embodied in the careers. The essential connection for women is with positive and accessibly public caring institutions for children and the elderly. O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver are impressive in their call to examine the "whole ensemble of state interventions, along with market-family relationships, to understand their impact on gender relations." In particular, they distinguish "claims on the state: where men have typically made claims as individuals and workers; women have often made claims as dependents and family members."³⁸ This is a line of

inquiry worth developing. There are many puzzles left to unravel.

- ¹ Reiko Kosugi, “Increase in the Number of Young Non-regular Workers: Situation and Problems” Japan Labor Bulletin 1 July 2002.
- ² Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford University Press, 1999, based on pp.85-86.
- ³ Ibid., pp.5-6
- ⁴ Ibid., p.173.
- ⁵ For a comparison of the same six countries, see Wallace Clement, “Who Works? Comparing Labor Market Practices” in Reconfigurations of Class and Gender, edited by Janeen Baxter and Mark Western. Stanford University Press, 2001.
- ⁶ Nancy Folbre and Julie A. Nelson, “For Love or Money — or Both?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14: 4 (Fall 2000): 138.
- ⁷ Birgit Pfau-Effinger, “Modernization of Family and Motherhood in Western Europe,” in Restructuring Gender Relations and Employment: The Decline of the Male Breadwinner, edited by Rosemary Crompton. Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.65-66. This is a development of her classification in Brigit Pfau-Effinger, “Culture or Structure as Explanations for Differences in Part-time Working in Germany, Finland and the Netherlands” in Part-time Prospects, ed. by J. O’Reilly and C. Fagan. Routledge, 1998.
- ⁸ Ibid., pp.62-63.
- ⁹ See Masanori Hashimoto, “Aspects of Labor Market Adjustment in Japan” Journal of Labor Economics, 11: 1 (1993): 138.
- ¹⁰ See Tom Gill, Men of Uncertainty: The Social Organization of Day Laborers in Contemporary Japan. State University of New York Press, 2001, p.10.
- ¹¹ See Masanori Hashimoto, “Aspects of Labor Market Adjustment in Japan,” Journal of Labor Economics, 11: 1 (1993): 142.
- ¹² Caroline Beavais, Lindsey McKay and Adam Seddon, “A Literature Review on Youth and Citizenship” CPNR/02. June 2001: Ottawa, p.11.
- ¹³ See The Economist 22 October 1994, p.150.
- ¹⁴ Yuko Ogasawara, ‘Office Ladies’ and Salaried Men: Power, Gender, and Work in Japanese Companies. University of California Press, 1998, p.46
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p.88.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p.159
- ¹⁷ Sue Yeandle, “Women, Men and Non-Standard Employment: Breadwinning and Caregiving in Germany, Italy and the UK” in Restructuring Gender Relations and Employment, ed. R. Crompton. Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 95.
- ¹⁸ European Industrial Relations Review # 331 (August 2001). Sweden’s paternity benefits is 12 months (with an additional 3 at lower benefit levels) with 2 months reserved exclusively for each of the father or mother (as of January 2002) at 80 per cent of salary (having shifted from 90% to 80% to 75% back to 80%). In contrast, Germany has 14 weeks maternity leave at 100 per cent of salary and 162 weeks total leave. The United States and Australia have no program of compensated leave, only employment-based ones. In the United States mothers are entitled to 12 weeks uncompensated leave and in Australia to 52 weeks. Canada and Japan are similar: 15 and 14 weeks respectively of paid leave at 55 and 60 per cent and overall leave for 50 and 58 weeks. See OECD, Employment Outlook, June 2001, Table 4.7, p. 144.
- ¹⁹ See James Albrecht, et. al. “Career Interruptions and Subsequent Earnings: A Re-examination Using Swedish Data” The Journal of Human Resources, 34: 2 (1998): 310.
- ²⁰ OECD, Employment Outlook. June 2001, p.135, Table 4.1. Sole mothers are most likely to experience poverty in Australia (61%), the United States (58%), Canada (51%) and Germany (39%) but least likely in Sweden (6%). Julia O’Connor, Ann Orloff and Sheila Shaver, States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.111.
- ²¹ Diane Sainsbury, Gender, Equality and Welfare States. Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 100
- ²² J.K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (as we knew it): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1996,

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- ²³ Ibid., p.236.
- ²⁴ See Wallace Clement and John Myles, Relations of Ruling: Class and Gender in Postindustrial Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994, Chapter 1.
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- ²⁸ Mark Western and Janeen Baxter, "The Links between Paid Work and Unpaid Work: Australia and Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s" in Reconfigurations of Class and Gender, p.104.
- ²⁹ Arja Tyrkkö, "The Intersection between Working Life and Parenthood: A Literature Review" Economic and Industrial Democracy 23: 1, February 2002: 110-111.
- ³⁰ Wuokko Knocke and Roxana Ng, "Women's Organizing and Immigration: Comparing the Canadian and Swedish Experiences" in Women's Organizing and Public Policy in Canada and Sweden, ed. by L. Briskin and M. Eliasson. McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal, 1999, pp.88-90.
- ³¹ Susan Houseman and Machiko Osawa, "What is the Nature of Part-time Work in the United States and Japan?" in Part-time Prospects, p. 233-234, 241.
- ³² See Akira Wadisada and Haeun Bae, "Why is the Part-time Rate Higher in Japan than in South Korea?" in Part-time Prospects, ed. by J. O'Reilly and C. Fagan. Routledge, 1998, p.253.
- ³³ Osawa Mari, "People in Irregular Modes of Employment: Are They Really Not Subject to Discrimination?" Social Science Journal 4: 2, 2001.
- ³⁴ Leah Vosko, Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment Relationship. University of Toronto Press, 2000.
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- ³⁶ Osawa Mari, "Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the mid-1990s" Social Science Japan Journal 3: 1, 2000.
- ³⁷ Ito Peng, "Women in the Middle: Welfare State Expansion and the Devolution in Japan" Social Politics 8: 2, Summer 2001, pp.193-195.
- ³⁸ O'Connor, et. al. States, Markets, Families, pp. 30-31.